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Abstract: 
The idea that there might be democratic forms of non-participation has been largely overlooked in 
the theoretical and empirical literature on democracy. Non-participation has variously been seen as 
a threat to the proper functioning of democracy, a rational choice, or (more rarely) as potentially 
beneficial at the systems level. We argue that there are forms of non-participation that may be 
justified on democratic grounds. Our main theoretical move is to distinguish between reflectivity 
(or thoughtfulness) and participation. We argue that the normative value of both participation and 
non-participation is conditioned by reflectivity, such that there may be democratically desirable 
forms of reflective non-participation. To support our claims, we provide examples of how non-
participation can help support democratic goods — such as inclusion, influence, and legitimacy — 
that are normally associated only with democratic participation. 
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1. Introduction 
Participation is central to the modern democratic imagination. Yet non-participation is an 
unavoidable and important part of democratic life. It is unavoidable because there are so many ways 
of being active in democratic systems and so many collective decisions to be made. Voting is one of 
the most important forms of participation, but individuals and groups might also choose to petition 
their governments, initiate referendums, campaign for candidates, participate in public engagement 
processes, engage in online activism, or join street protests. Individuals might also enter the ranks 
of the political elite by, for example, joining the public service, running for elected office, or writing 
political commentaries. But participation is costly in terms of both time and effort and, as such, we 
must continually make choices about when to be politically active and when to refrain from 
participating. And even when we are willing and able to act, we may, instead, decide that non-
participation is the better option. We may decide not to participate for self-serving reasons, which 
might threaten the integrity of a democratic system or process. Alternatively, non-participation 
might, in certain circumstances, be desirable from a democratic perspective.  1
 In this paper, we argue that participation and non-participation are like two sides of the same 
coin: when we are thinking about what makes for good participation, we also have to think about 
what does (or does not) make for good non-participation. Although it is theoretically possible to 
have 100 percent participation rates during elections, for example, it is not possible for individuals 
to choose participation in response to every opportunity they might have to actively influence 
collective decision-making processes. More importantly, participation may not always be the best 
option from a democratic perspective. In some cases, the integrity of a democratic process or 
 We do not mean to imply that examples of reflective non-participation will be seen as desirable by all observers. 1
Instead, we mean to say that democratic non-participation may be justifiable, at least in principle, on democratic 
grounds, even if observers do not agree that non-participation is warranted in specific cases.
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system may be better served if some people reflectively decided to not participate for democratic 
reasons. In this paper we argue that there are, indeed, normatively desirable forms of democratic 
non-participation. 
 The idea that there might be democratic forms of non-participation has been largely 
overlooked in the theoretical and empirical literature on democracy. Non-participation is typically 
seen as a threat to the proper functioning of a democratic system, or as a rational choice in some (or 
most) circumstances.   Others have argued that it would be better if certain types of persons or 2
groups, such as those who do not know enough to vote well, remain apathetic, disinterested, and 
uninvolved.   In our account, although participation remains an essential democratic good, there are 3
forms of non-participation that may be desirable, not because they represent the freedom that 
individuals should have to remove themselves from politics or because they help protect political 
systems from too much (or the wrong sort of) participation, but instead because they are 
consciously understood by non-participants as forms of democratic non-participation. 
  Our main theoretical move is to distinguish between two related, but conceptually distinct, 
dimensions of democratic life: reflectivity and participation. This conceptual move identifies two 
familiar forms of participation and non-participation (namely, “reflective participation” and 
“unreflective non-participation”), but it also reveals two other possibilities: “unreflective 
participation” and “reflective non-participation.” The forms of reflective non-participation that we 
discuss are examples of people advancing democratic norms or objectives through non-
participation, and the concept of democratic non-participation therefore has an oxymoronic feel. 
 On “threats” see Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: University of 2
California Press, 1984); Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970). On “rational choice” see Anthony Downs, “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy,” 
Journal of Political Economy 65 (April 1957): 35-150; John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Stealth 
Democracy: Americans' Beliefs about how Government Should Work (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
 Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in A 3
Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Jason Brennan, The Ethics of Voting (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2012); Samuel P. Huntington, The Crisis of Democracy (New York: New York University 
Press, 1975).  
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This has led to some confusion: readers of this paper have sometimes found it difficult to think of 
something like non-voting for the purposes of protest as a form of non-participation. It looks like a 
form of political action because it is a protest. We share this intuition, but we want to emphasize 
that just because an inaction is intended to have some impact does not mean that we should think of 
it as action. When someone decides not to vote as a form of protest, they are non-participants with 
respect to voting, even if their non-participation is intended to have some impact or send a signal or 
message.  
 This paper thus aims to reorient our thinking about political participation in several ways. 
First, we want to articulate non-participation as part of the repertoire of good democratic practice. 
Many examples of democratic non-participation are familiar, such as choosing not to speak in the 
context of a deliberation in order to make room for others to speak, or refraining from voting as a 
form of protest against a democratic system that lacks legitimacy. The problem, from our 
perspective, is that these forms of non-participation are not typically understood as democratic non-
participation. They are more commonly either seen as forms of participation (which they are not), 
or they are treated — in observational terms — the same as forms of non-participation that result 
from apathy or disinterest. Our theory of democratic non-participation gives us a new, and we hope 
useful way, of making distinctions between normatively desirable and undesirable forms of non-
participation. This approach, furthermore, enables us to identify less familiar forms of democratic 
non-participation, such as deference to the more affected, that might go unnoticed — and indeed 
have gone unnoticed — without a theory of democratic non-participation.   
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 Second, we challenge the (often implicit) idea that people can be organized into two broad 
category types: the inactive and the active.  Instead, we should recognize that each individual must 4
continually make judgments about when (or how) to be active or inactive in response to each 
opportunity to participate. There are, of course, individuals who nearly always (consciously or 
unconsciously) choose political passivity over action, but it is not possible to be active all the time. 
As such, it is not helpful to categorize individuals as “passive citizens” or “active citizens” because 
this hides the fact that people must be inactive in response to a majority of their options for being 
active in democratic societies.  5
 Third, while there is overlap between theories of “exit” and what we call “democratic non-
participation,” they are conceptually distinct.  While exit is often thought of as being oriented to 6
individual goods, with the improved responsiveness of organizations as the unintended side-effect, 
it can also be the case that exit — like democratic non-participation — can be motivated by the 
desire to improve the organization or association in question.  Furthermore, democratic non-7
participation itself may be considered a form of exit when it is used to protest forced or unwilling 
inclusion, as when, for example, colonized peoples refuse to participate in the democratic processes 
 Schlozman, for instance, talks of “...the kinds of people that are drawn into political activity...” Although we believe 4
she would concede our point — that people must continually choose to be active or inactive in response to particular 
opportunities to engage — her characterization of the “active individual” makes it appear as if there are some “kinds” or 
“types” of people who are politically active and other types who are not. In reality, most of us are politically active 
some of the time and inactive most of the time, given our limited participatory resources.  See Kay L. Schlozman 
“Creative Participation: Concluding Thoughts From the Land of the Boston Tea Party” in Creative Participation: 
Responsibility-Taking in the Political World, ed. M. Micheletti and A. S. McFarland (London: Paradigm Publishers, 
2012), 173-190.  
 The language of “citizenship”, which we try to avoid in this paper, also hides the fact that non-citizens have 5
opportunities to participate in various ways in democratic systems – such as joining protests, writing letters, or going to 
public consultation meetings – even if they are not entitled to vote or run for office. 
 There is an extensive literature on the political implications of exit. See, e.g., Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and 6
Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970); 
K. Dowding, P. John, T. Mergoupis, and M. Van Vugt, “Exit, voice and loyalty: Analytic and empirical developments” 
European Journal of Political Research 37 (June 2000): 469-495; Mark E. Warren, “Voting with Your Feet: Exit-based 
Empowerment in Democratic Theory,” The American Political Science Review 105 (November 2011): 683-701; Jennet 
Kirkpatrick, The Virtues of Exit: On Resistance and Quitting Politics (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2017). 
 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing this point on us.7
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of colonizers.  However, there are many forms of non-participation that do not involve exit, but 8
which involve supporting — and remaining committed to — democratic processes by not 
participating in them.  
 Fourth, we would like to emphasize at the outset that democratic non-participation, as we 
have conceived it, is not a marginal matter. Political non-participation is far more common than 
participation when we take a wide view of our opportunities to be politically active. Many of us 
vote but most of us do not join protests, write political commentaries, start petitions, organize 
advocacy groups, run for public office, or participate regularly in other political activities. Many of 
us will do some of these things at some point, but all of us are inactive in response to a majority of 
our opportunities to be active because of the limited participatory resources that we have. If this is 
the case (and we think it is), students of democracy have spent too much time thinking only about 
participation and not enough time thinking about whether there are better or worse ways of not 
participating. 
 The paper will proceed from here as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review how political 
non-participation has been conceptualized in democratic theory. In Section 3, we develop and 
discuss our theoretical framework, which makes a distinction between reflectivity and participation 
to draw out the differences between democratically productive or desirable forms of non-
participation and those that are not likely to be justifiable from a democratic perspective. We do not 
set out to address all possible conceptions of democracy, but we do in this section claim that our 
emphasis on reflectivity is consistent with most mainstream accounts of democracy in so far as they 
are premised on a reflective choosing agent. In Section 4, we discuss forms of democratic non-
participation, emphasizing how non-participation can help support or produce democratic goods, 
and in particular those goods typically associated with participation. We organize this discussion 
 However, in our view this does not look like a simple case of exit because the colonized persons did not see 8
themselves as part of the polity to begin with.
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first around inclusion and influence, discussing ways in which non-participation can be used to 
support the effective participation of others (4.1.1) or to influence the dynamics of collective 
decision processes (4.1.2), and then around legitimation, exploring non-participation as protest 
(4.2.1) and as legitimation through mindful monitoring (4.2.2). We then briefly consider the 
counterintuitive possibility that non-participation can contribute to the classic participatory good of 
self-development (4.3), before drawing our conclusions. 
 2. Non-Participation in Democratic Theory 
Non-participation is often seen as deeply problematic to democratic systems.  Even minimalist 9
models of democracy, such as those developed by Schumpeter and Przeworski, require individuals 
to participate in choosing their leaders.  There are, however, scholars who have argued that some 10
degree of passivity among mass publics may be beneficial to the system as a whole. Political 
scientists in the 1950s, for example, worried that some segments of the population — such as the 
poor and the working classes — had authoritarian beliefs or tendencies, and it would therefore be 
better if they remained politically inactive (as they were inclined to be) because this would reduce 
the risk of anti-democratic leaders being elected.   Berelson and his colleagues worried that the 11
politically active have tendencies that may be viewed as obstacles to a smoothly functioning 
democratic system. In their view, politically active individuals are likely to be too absorbed in 
public affairs, highly partisan, rigid in their beliefs and thus less likely to change their minds or 
promote the sorts of compromises that may be necessary to find broadly acceptable solutions to 
 See, e.g., Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory; Barber, Strong Democracy, (see note 2 above for both 9
sources).
 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 1943); Adam Przeworski, 10
“Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense” in Democracy’s Value, ed. I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordon 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 23-55. 
 Seymour M. Lipset, “Democracy and Working Class Authoritarianism,” American Sociological Review 24 (August 11
1959): 482-501; Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited (Chatham, N.J: Chatham House Publishers, 
1987). 
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political problems.  For this reason, Berelson and his colleagues argued that “a sizable group of 12
less interested citizens is desirable as a ‘cushion’ to absorb the intense action of highly motivated 
partisans.”  13
 In contrast, Huntington was concerned about the spread of participation beyond elections to 
institutions that, in his view, are fundamentally unsuited to them, such as workplaces and 
universities. He also worried about protest movements, the expansion of white-collar unionism, and 
the assertion of minority rights. Huntington believed that these developments overload democracy 
with diverse demands that cannot jointly be satisfied, and he thus concluded that the “effective 
operation of a democratic political system usually requires some measure of apathy and 
noninvolvement on the part of some individuals and groups.”  14
 These three arguments — that some groups have anti-democratic beliefs and it is therefore 
better if they remain inactive; that those who are comparatively politically uninterested help temper 
the obstructionist tendencies of activists and entrenched partisans; and that democratic systems 
cannot bear the weight of too much participation — each view non-participation as a social or 
political good, but they do not consider forms of non-participation that may be desirable on 
democratic grounds. Indeed, non-participation has rarely been viewed as a potentially legitimate 
democratic option; it is, instead, more often viewed as a consequence of either: 1) a lack of 
opportunity; 2) a lack of interest; or 3) a lack of reflectivity. 
2.1. A Lack of Opportunity 
Many scholars are rightly concerned that those who “choose” not to participate may be constrained 
in various ways that make participation unlikely, ineffective, difficult, or impossible. People may be 
inactive because they lack socio-economic or political resources, or because they are legally 
 Berelson et al., Voting, (see note 3 above). 12
 Ibid, 317. 13
 Huntington, The Crisis of Democracy, 114 (see note 3 above).14
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excluded or socially alienated from the political arena.  The most nefarious forms of non-15
participation may be the result of unobserved power structures that prevent individuals from acting 
on their genuine interests.  When individuals are significantly constrained by unobserved power 16
structures, we cannot know whether they genuinely prefer non-participation to participation. While 
it is important to consider the political, social, and ideational factors that may constrain political 
action, we do not focus on these problems here because we are interested in self-conscious 
decisions to refrain from participating in response to real and recognized opportunities to be 
politically active.  
2.2. A Lack of Interest 
Within the purview of largely unconstrained choices for action or inaction, many scholars associate 
non-participation with a lack of political interest. There is evidence that political interest is 
associated with higher levels of participation.  Indeed, a lack of interest is one of the most common 17
reasons cited by survey respondents who are asked why they do not participate.  In their book 18
Stealth Democracy, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse use surveys to show that many individuals do not 
like politics and prefer to avoid it whenever they can. They argue that most people prefer to leave 
the difficult work of “doing politics” to others — but only when they are confident that the 
powerful will not take advantage of them.  19
 On “lack,” see Kay L. Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady, The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political 15
Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). On “legally 
excluded or socially alienated,” see Iris M. Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
 Tom DeLuca, The Two Faces of Political Apathy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995); Steven Lukes, 16
Power: A Radical View (London: Palgrave, 2005). 
 Pippa Norris, Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 17
86.
 Declan Bannon, “Voting, Non-Voting and Consumer Buying Behavior: Non-Voter Segmentation (NVS) and the 18
Underlying Causes of Electoral Inactivity,” Journal of Public Affairs 3 (July 2006): 138-151, at 146; Michael Marsh, 
“Accident or Design? Non-Voting in Ireland,” Irish Political Studies 6 (April 1991): 1-14, at 4; Cliff Zukin, Scott 
Keeter, Molly Andolina, Krista Jenkins, and Michael X. Delli Carpini, A New Engagement? Political Participation, 
Civic Life, and the Changing American Citizen (New York: Oxford University, 2006), 92.
  Hibbing and  Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy, (see note 2 above). 19
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 Political non-participation resulting from a lack of interest may be normatively desirable 
because it represents a free choice to avoid politics in favour of other concerns or pursuits. For 
many political thinkers — most obviously Hobbes and Constant — a successful political society is 
one where individuals have the freedom to pursue their version of the good life (constrained only by 
the law) in a relatively stable political environment without having to worry too much about politics 
itself. Thinking along these lines, Morris-Jones, for example, argued that being free to choose 
political apathy over action should be seen as a privilege of living in a functional, liberal society.  20
Similarly, Anthony Crosland, wrote that “all experience shows that only a small minority of the 
population will wish to participate” and the majority will “prefer to lead a full family life and 
cultivate their garden.”  On these accounts, political passivity is a freely chosen and entirely 21
justified expression of a lack of interest in politics, but it is not justified as a productive democratic 
option in its own right. 
 2.3. A Lack of Reflection 
Non-participation has also been associated with a lack of reflection or thoughtfulness. Although 
similar in some respects, a lack of reflection is not the same as a lack of interest. One may be 
uninterested in a subject (such as math or politics) but nevertheless sufficiently thoughtful to 
perform some task (such as writing a test or voting). It may be more difficult to motivate 
thoughtfulness when one is uninterested in a subject, but a lack of interest does not itself indicate a 
lack of reflectivity.  
 The assumption that political inactivity goes together with unreflectiveness is related to the 
claim that good democratic citizens should be both active and “enlightened.”  Indeed, the causal 22
 W. H. Morris Jones, “In Defence of Apathy: Some Doubts on the Duty to Vote” Political Studies 2 (February 1954): 20
25-37, at 36-37. 
 Charles Anthony R. Crosland, Socialism Now (London: Cape, 1974), 65-66.21
 Angus Campbell, “The Passive Citizen” Acta Sociologica 2 (July 1962): 9-21, at 9.22
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relationship between participation and reflectivity is thought to run in both directions. On one hand, 
there is evidence that those who know less about politics are also less likely to participate.  On the 23
other hand, theorists such as J.S. Mill and Carole Pateman have argued that the possibility of 
democratic participation (and the responsibility that comes with it) is an inducement to learning and 
reflection.  These claims help emphasize the extent to which reflectivity and participation can be 24
mutually supportive, but this way of thinking can also obscure the differences between these two 
concepts. Just because reflectivity and action often do go together, does not mean that they must. 
And just because those who do not participate often do so unreflectively, does not mean that this 
must always be so. 
 The failure to analytically separate reflectivity and participation results in accounts of non-
participation that vacillate uneasily between inactivity and unreflectiveness. Consider, again, the 
claim that apathy on the part of a “sizable group” dampens processes of social and political change, 
and thus serves as a source of stability within the system as a whole.  In order for the apathetic to 25
have this dampening effect they must exercise their influence by being active in some way, 
probably by voting. In this case, then, “apathy” is used not to refer (as is usually the case) to 
unreflective, political inaction; instead, Berelson et al. use the term to say something about the 
quality of reflectiveness attached to political action (in this case, the act of voting). What Berelson 
and his colleagues mean is that some voters are basically unreflective, and their influence can help 
dampen the more radical or partisan objectives of those who are both active and reflective. What is 
important for our purposes is that these accounts of political “apathy” fail to make explicit 
distinctions between reflectivity (or cognitive engagement) and political activity.  
 E.g., Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter, What Americans Know about Politics and Why it Matters (New 23
Haven: Yale University Press, 1996). 
 John Stuart Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government” in John Stuart Mill: On Liberty and Other Essays, 24
ed. J. Grey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008 [1861]); Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (see note 2 
above). 
Berelson et al., Voting, (see note 3 above).25
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 Modern theorists who invoke the concept of passivity have also often failed to make clear 
distinctions between reflectivity and action. MacKenzie and Warren, for example, argue that voters 
might use deliberative minipublics as trusted information proxies when voting in referendums on 
complex public issues such as electoral reform.  They argue that this is a “good way of being 26
passive” because it involves placing warranted trust in an institution that is designed to be (or 
known to be) representative, independent, nonpartisan, well informed, and deliberative. But on this 
account, individuals are in fact active with respect to voting, and “passive” only with respect to 
reflectivity: they vote but they rely on members of a minipublic to do the difficult work of deciding 
how to vote. Thus MacKenzie and Warren conflate reflectivity and action, calling voters who rely 
on information cues “passive” when they really mean to say that they are not fully engaged 
cognitively. 
3. Reflective Non-Participation 
Political participation, as we understand it, combines an internal quality of reflectiveness and an 
externally observable act such as taking part in a protest, casting a vote, signing a petition, engaging 
in public argument, and so on. These two elements are often — though not always  — conflated. 27
When we talk of participation we usually mean someone who is both reflecting and participating. 
 Michael K. MacKenzie and Mark E. Warren, “Two Trust-Based Uses of Minipublics in Democratic Systems” in 26
Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale, ed. J. Parkinson and J. Mansbridge (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 95-124.
 Recent research on apathy and alienation, for instance, explicitly challenges the tendency to conflate apathy with non-27
participation. For instance, Marsh and his colleagues write that “it is frequently assumed that if individuals do not 
engage in the activities that researchers take to represent political participation, they are politically apathetic. In our 
view, this is an unsustainable proposition because political participation, defined in this way, has a number of ‘others’, 
including apathy, alienation/disaffection and other types of participation.” See David Marsh, Therese O’Toole, and Su 
Jones, Young People and Politics in the UK: Apathy or Alienation? (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), 18. More recent empirical work by Dahl and colleagues has explicitly defined apathy as an 
attitudinal orientation, though they also emphasize that this is an innovation in the context of mainstream work on 
participation which “understand[s] political apathy as a lack of involvement in political participation.” See Viktor Dahl, 
Erik Amnå, Shakuntala Banaji, Monique Landberg, Jan Šerek, Norberto Ribeiro, Mai Beilmann, Vassilis Pavlopoulos & 
Bruna Zani, “Apathy or alienation? Political passivity among youths across eight European Union countries” in 
European Journal of Developmental Psychology 15 (January 2018): 284-301, at 285. While these and other empirical 
studies have recognized something like our distinction, we think it has not been sufficiently emphasized or fully 
developed within democratic theory, and our aim in this paper is to give it clearer theoretical shape and explore its 
normative dimensions.
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And when we imagine a non-participant, we are tempted to imagine someone being unreflective as 
well as not participating. In this section, we elaborate our conception of reflectivity and discuss its 
relation to participation and non-participation. 
3.1. Reflectivity, Attentiveness, and Internal Deliberation 
Reflectivity presupposes a degree of attentiveness or monitoring.  To be reflective in political 28
terms, a person must be aware of opportunities for political participation, but reflectivity requires 
more than just attentiveness.  Reflectivity also involves the internal consideration of reasons for 29
acting or not acting. This is similar to Goodin’s notion of “internal-reflective” deliberation.  Like 30
Goodin, we treat reflectiveness as choosing a course of action after some consideration rather than 
merely picking one with “scant regard to evidence or argument”  But Goodin also loads 31
reflectivity with normative content, arguing that those who are reflective should make the 
arguments and interests of others “imaginatively present” in their minds, so that “deliberation 
within” can reproduce the sort of empathetic or other-regarding qualities of judgment that have 
been associated with interpersonal deliberation by other deliberative democrats.  This function of 32
reflectivity is not our primary concern in this paper — although some forms of democratic non-
participation, such as deference to the more affected, do require making others “imaginatively 
 On “attentiveness” see Kevin Elliott, “Making Attentive Citizens: The Ethics of Democratic Engagement, Political 28
Equality, and Social Justice” in Res Publica 24 (February 2018): 73–91. On “monitoring” see Michael Schudson, The 
Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life (New York: The Free Press, 1998); John Keane, The Life and Death of 
Democracy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009); Erik Amnå and Joakim Ekman, “Standby Citizens: Diverse 
Faces of Political Passivity” in European Political Science Review 6 (May 2014): 261-281. We discuss the idea of 
monitory or “stand-by” citizenship in greater detail below.
 Elliot regards attentiveness as a “stable proclivity or aspect of character.” In contrast (as explained in note 4 above) 29
we want to get away from notions of a participatory “type,” and focus on modes of participation or non-participation 
instead. Elliot, Making Attentive Citizens (see note 28 above), esp. 75-76. 
 Robert E. Goodin, “Democratic Deliberation Within” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 29 (Winter 2000): 81-109.30
 Robert E. Goodin, Innovating Democracy: Democratic Theory and Practice After the Deliberative (Oxford: Oxford 31
University Press, 2008), 20. See also Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Sidney Morgenbesser, “Picking and Choosing” Social 
Research 44 (Winter 1977): 757-785. 
 Goodin, Democratic Deliberation Within (see note 30 above), 83. 32
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present” and empathizing with them. On our account, reflectivity simply requires a minimal 
consideration of reasons for or against action in a given situation. The reflective person must 
thoughtfully consider her options to participate or not participate, she must be aware of the fact she 
is doing so, and she should have some sense of the terms, rationales, objectives, or principles upon 
which her judgments are based.  
Our concept of reflectivity is not overly demanding but it nevertheless does some heavy 
theoretical lifting: it rules out impulsive behaviour, as well as behaviour that is unwitting, 
unconscious, habitual, or generated by unrecognized (or unacknowledged) external stimuli.  This 33
conception of reflectivity helps clarify distinctions between reasoned actions and “knee-jerk” 
reactions but it does not go so far as to identify reflectivity with rationality. Individuals might make 
reflective judgments while at the same time being aware that those judgments are not rational. For 
example, someone may decide to vote because she sees it as a duty, and because it makes her feel 
good, even though she might, also, know that each vote has a fantastically small probability of 
being decisively influential.  On our terms if this individual thought about voting as a duty, and she 34
was aware that she was doing so, she is being reflective even if she is not being fully rational (on 
that account of rationality).  
3.2. Reflectivity and Democracy 
Our suggestion that reflectivity provides participation with its normative content follows from the 
basic intuition that democratic decisions look less legitimate if we discover that those who have 
made them do not understand why they made them. This intuition is widely shared in diverse 
 Passive information acquisition and behavioural cueing may in the right circumstances serve democratically decided 33
or democratically productive ends, but on our account they are not in themselves reflective. See Thaler and Sunstein, 
Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (New York: Penguin, 2008).
 André Blais, To Vote or Not to Vote: The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory (Pittsburgh: University of 34
Pittsburgh Press, 2000); Anthony Downs, “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy” (see note 2 
above). 
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approaches to thinking about democracy. The normative value of reflectivity is most obviously 
present in accounts of democracy that focus on substantive forms of representation, deliberation, 
and participation.  Deliberative democrats, for instance, insist that legitimate collective decisions 35
are those that are, or might be, justifiable to those who are affected. It is not the decisions or votes 
of individuals that do the work of legitimation, but rather the ways in which those decisions may be 
justified to others.   36
But even minimalist theories of democracy — such as those outlined by Schumpeter and 
Przeworski — rely on a degree of reflectivity for their normative legitimacy in so far as they are 
still rooted in the decisions of reflective choosing agents. Although Schumpeter clearly rejects the 
idea that voters have well-formed policy preferences that constitute a common will that it is the job 
of governments to enact, his conception of democracy as a “free competition for a free vote” 
nonetheless makes some substantive demands on voters. He allows that voters must to some degree 
have their latent wills “called to life” by political leaders, but he recognizes that there are limits to 
this, and that a condition of the success of the democratic method is that electorates “must be on an 
intellectual and moral level high enough to be proof against the offerings of the crook and the 
crank.”  Przeworski, interestingly, does make the case that rotating office randomly — that is, 37
removing all connection to a reflective choosing agents — would itself (theoretically) give losers 
reasons to comply with the result.  But he goes on to defend a distinctive claim about why voting 38
itself can induce compliance, and this claim draws on the idea that voting “reveals information 
 On “representation,” see Hanna F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 35
1967). On “deliberation,” see Simone Chambers, “Deliberative Democratic Theory” Annual Review of Political Science 
6 (June 2003): 307-326; Robert E. Goodin, Reflective Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Amy 
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Young, 
Inclusion and Democracy (see note 15 above). On “participation,” see Barber, Strong Democracy; and Pateman, 
Participation and Democratic Theory (see note 2 above for both sources).
 E.g., Chambers, “Deliberative Democratic Theory”; Gutmann and Thompson Why Deliberative Democracy (see note 36
35 above for both sources). 
 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (see note 10 above), 271, 294.37
 Przeworski, “Minimalist Conception of Democracy” (see note 10 above), 45.38
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about passions, values, and interests.” In this way, “even if voting does not reveal a unique 
collective will, it does indicate limits to rule. Why else,” he asks rhetorically, “would we interpret 
participation as a sign of legitimacy”?  It is hard to see how voting could reliably serve to indicate 39
the relative strength of social positions if the votes themselves were random or wholly manipulated, 
or if people are simply forced to vote. Thus, even the most minimalist accounts of democratic 
legitimacy involve implicit claims about the reflectivity of the choosing agents — the voters — on 
which they rest. 
On a minimalist account of democracy, voters are not required to explain their decisions to 
others or publicly justify them, and there is no expectation that voters will always have good 
reasons — or reasons that we agree with — for the decisions that they make, but most observers 
agree that democratic outcomes, such as majority decisions, look less legitimate when they are 
predicated on thoughtlessness, insufficient reflection, misinformation, or misinterpretation. This is, 
in part, why political scientists have focused so much attention on the importance of political 
knowledge and information.  At the most basic level, we have to think that people know why they 40
voted for a candidate or why they support certain policy options to think that the outcome of a vote 
might carry the force of legitimacy. If we think that votes are cast randomly, or completely 
apathetically, or if people have been duped or lied to, we tend to think that those votes lack 
legitimacy, even if they produce large majorities.  
We raise the above points because they help us think more clearly about the nature of 
participation and non-participation in democratic systems. If it is true that democratic legitimacy 
relies on reflectivity for much of its normative force, then we should think less about participation 
 Ibid, 49.39
 E.g., Brennan, The Ethics of Voting (see note 3 above); Delli Carpini and Keeter, What Americans Know About 40
Politics and Why it Matters (see note 23 above).
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as an unalloyed democratic good, and more about the role that reflectivity plays in conditioning the 
normative desirability of both participation and non-participation.  
[figure 1 about here] 
This conceptual move can be visualized by relocating normativity from the horizontal to the 
vertical axis in Figure 1. From this perspective, there are forms of participation that are normatively 
undesirable (i.e. unreflective participation) and forms of reflective non-participation that may be 
desirable. We say may be desirable because reflectivity is not enough: we can imagine forms of 
reflective non-participation that are undesirable from a democratic perspective, such as taking 
bribes to refrain from voting. As such, we argue that democratic forms of non-participation — like 
democratic forms of participation — must meet two criteria: they must be reflective, and they must 
be justifiable on democratic grounds. This, then, excludes forms of non-participation (or 
participation) that are unreflective (like those motivated by habit or unconscious impulse) and those 
that are reflective or thoughtful but undemocratic (or antidemocratic) in one way or another.  41
 It is worth clarifying that we are primarily interested in democratic motivations and not, 
necessarily, the system level effects of (democratically grounded) decisions to be politically active 
or inactive. Forms of democratic participation or non-participation may be justifiable on democratic 
grounds without being: 1) justified to all observers; 2) justifiable on all accounts of democracy; or 
3) effective in terms of achieving system-wide effects. It is, then, possible to be a reflective non-
participant in democratically justifiable ways even if one's non-participation does not actually 
improve democratic processes or outcomes to any substantive (or measurable) degree. 
 It is worth pointing out that each of us is likely to occupy each of the quadrants in Figure 1, at the same time, 41
depending on our responses to specific participatory opportunities. One might be a passionate activist with an advocacy 
group (Quadrant II), a largely unreflective habitual voter in national elections (Quadrant IV), a thoughtful observer of a 
protest movement (Quadrant I), and an unreflective (or completely unaware) non-participant in local town hall meetings 
(Quadrant III). 
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 Furthermore, we do not discuss unreflective action at any length in this paper because our 
primary concern is with democratic forms of non-participation. Nonetheless, unreflective action 
raises equally important (although different) normative considerations. We might, for example, 
prefer inaction over unreflective action on moral, ethical, or epistemological grounds.  Individuals 42
might vote without sufficient thought about the consequences of their actions, or their actions might 
be conditioned by power structures that they do not fully recognize.  In either case, the normative 43
desirability of participation is undermined by the fact that it is unreflective, insufficiently 
independent, or both. 
4. Forms of Democratic Non-Participation 
Political participation is closely associated with at least three democratic goods.  Perhaps most 44
obviously, participation is a manifestation of inclusion, which, in turn, can enable at least some 
measure of influence over collective decisions in the form of voice or votes. Secondly, participation 
contributes to the legitimation of political processes. Voting, for example, not only influences the 
selection of particular office holders, it also signals consent to the political system as a whole. 
Thirdly, participation has been valued for its contribution to self-development.  On this account, 45
those who participate learn to be better democrats and more effective participants through their 
 Brennan, The Ethics of Voting (see note 3 above). 42
 DeLuca, The Two Faces of Political Apathy; Lukes Power (see note 16 above for both sources).43
 In this paper, we draw on concepts that are widely viewed as democratic goods within democratic theory but we do 44
not build an independent argument for them or claim that this list is exhaustive. For a recent discussion of the types of 
goods that may be required in democratic systems see Mark E. Warren, “A Problem-Based Approach to Democratic 
Theory” The American Political Science Review 111 (February 2017): 39-53.
 Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government” (see note 24 above); Pateman, Participation and Democratic 45
Theory (see note 2 above). 
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participation. In this section we ask: Might some of these democratic goods also be served — or 
served in different ways — by non-participation? 
4.1. Inclusion and Influence 
4.1.1. Supporting the Effective Participation of Others 
There is little doubt that inclusion and influence are primary democratic goods.  Inclusion is about 46
getting one’s foot in the door, or getting a seat at the decision-making table. We cannot have 
influence over collective decisions if we are not meaningfully included in the processes that are 
used to make those decisions. But there is a conceptual distinction between inclusion and influence. 
One might be formally included but still unable to exercise effective influence. This will be the case 
if one’s status as an equal participant is undermined by, for example, socio-economic, racial, or 
gender stereotypes. These forms of “internal exclusion” — as Young calls them — disempower the 
formally included.  But there is another option as well: if inclusion and influence are conceptually 47
distinct, it is also possible for those who are included to reflectively refrain from exercising their 
influence in order to support the effective participation of others.  
 Perhaps the most straightforward example of reflective non-participation supporting the 
effective participation of others has to do with the deliberative practice of “not talking too much.” 
In effective deliberative environments participants are expected to both talk and listen.  If time is a 48
scare commodity in a deliberative environment, and if the influence that any one participant has 
depends on an ability to persuade others, it is essential that each participant refrain from talking too 
much in order to help facilitate the potential influence of others. Although it is important for 
 Robert Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Warren, “Voting with Your Feet,” (see note 46
6 above).  
 Young, Inclusion and Democracy (see note 15 above). 47
 Andrew Dobson, Listening for Democracy: Recognition, Representation, Reconciliation (Oxford: Oxford University 48
Press, 2014); André Bächtiger and John Parkinson, Mapping and Measuring Deliberation: Towards a New Deliberative 
Quality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).  
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everyone in a deliberative group to both talk and listen, it may be especially important for those 
with normally powerful or influential voices to consciously reflect on their influence and refrain 
from talking when appropriate. It has, for example, been demonstrated that men tend to dominate 
discussions in small-scale face-to-face deliberations.  In this context, by consciously choosing to 49
remain silent at appropriate moments, men can create space for the voices of women, making 
deliberative exercises more deliberative, equal, or fair, and deliberative outcomes more 
representative of a fuller diversity of potential perspectives. 
It is important to emphasize that this form of democratic non-participation is, in fact, non-
participation within the context of inclusion. Men who reflectively remain silent in order to make 
room for others (such as women) to speak must do so while being present in those deliberations. 
They are, then, both participating, when talking, and not participating, when choosing to remain 
silent. The fact that they are included in the deliberations, and thus have opportunities to participate, 
does not challenge the point we are making. The fact of inclusion – or presence – is, in this case, a 
prerequisite for democratic non-participation, while the non-participation, itself, is used to support 
the effective inclusion of others. 
It is also important to note that what is at stake in this example is choosing not to speak in 
order to make space for others when one would otherwise have spoken. This presupposes listening 
or, more generally, mindful monitoring of the context, but this form of non-participation involves 
more than simply listening. The important point in this example is the decision to remain silent out 
of concern for the effective participation of others.  50
 Christopher F. Karpowitz and Tali Mendelberg, The Silent Sex: Gender, Deliberation, and Institutions (Princeton: 49
Princeton University Press, 2014).  
 Nor, we should add, do we regard listening itself as a form of participation. We recognize that attentive listening is an 50
aspect of good deliberation, but that is because listening is a condition for finding space to speak and respond – and for 
letting others speak – rather than because it is participation in itself. To see our point, consider a college seminar. Those 
who attend but never speak may be members of the seminar, but they are not participants in any ordinary sense of the 
term – and they certainly do not receive participation credits in our courses. Those who listen attentively in a 
deliberation will be better positioned to participate effectively but they are not participants in the deliberation until they 
actually speak. This approach is consistent with how participation is normally understood in empirical studies of 
deliberation, e.g., Karpowitz and Mendelberg The Silent Sex (see note 49 above). 
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 Reflective non-participation can also help support inclusion and influence in other political 
contexts, such as protests or social movements. Consider an example from Argentina, where, from 
1977 to 1983, mothers held regular protests to bring awareness to the disappearances of their sons 
during the “Dirty War” period. As Alison Brysk explains, “Mothers of the disappeared asked other 
relatives (especially fathers) not to go to the [protests], since they felt that the police were least 
likely to attack unarmed middle-aged women, while the men might become drawn into the 
conflict.”  In this situation, the men had to choose between two desirable goods: 1) making their 51
voices heard as part of a protest movement; and 2) helping to keep the peace and thereby ensuring 
that others could make their voices heard. The men who refrained from protesting in this case, did 
so out of deference to the women whose voices might be silenced by the men’s participation. This 
form of non-participation is, then, qualitatively different from forms of passivity that are 
unreflective or rooted in a lack of motivation. In this case, the men who chose non-participation 
over action might have preferred to act instead. They had to be persuaded not to act, and for some, 
non-participation may have been the more difficult option. Those who were motivated to not act did 
so reflectively and in response to principled considerations about the undesirability of violence and 
the effective participation of others.  
 Political elites might also use reflective non-participation to enhance the voices or influence 
of others — even, occasionally, their political opponents. Consider, for example, the practice of 
“pairing” in legislative chambers. Pairing is a legislative tradition whereby a representative refrains 
from voting because another representative is absent for reasons that have nothing to do with 
politics, such as illness, weather, or the birth of a child. Representatives who “form pairs” must 
have opposing positions on the vote in question and, as such, the practice is intended to produce the 
 Alison Brysk, The Politics of Human Rights in Argentina: Protest, Change, and Democratization (Stanford: Stanford 51
University Press, 1994), 8. 
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same result that would have prevailed if both members had voted.  There are several ways to think 52
about the democratic goods associated with the practice of pairing. On one level, pairing may be 
viewed as productive cooperation between political opponents. More substantively, pairing ensures 
that representatives who are absent are nevertheless empowered with respect to voice — and this, in 
turn, helps produce the necessary conditions for electoral accountability. If a representative is absent 
for a vote it will be difficult for voters to know with confidence which way the representative would 
have voted, even if his or her position is publicly stated before or after the vote. On this view, 
pairing helps ensure that the commitment involved in voting is preserved, and recorded in the 
official record, even when a representative is not able to vote. Lastly, pairing aims to preserve the 
democratically decided distribution of seats within a legislature even when some members of the 
legislature are absent for reasons that are beyond their control. Maintaining a democratically 
decided balance of power will be of little practical import in most cases, but it is an important 
principle nonetheless, and it will be of practical concern in those rare cases where one of a pair of 
votes would have been decisive.  53
Indeed, the normative significance of pairing can be seen in the breach, as in a recent case in 
the United Kingdom, in which Conservative Member of Parliament (MP) Brandon Lewis broke his 
pairing agreement with Liberal Democrat MP Jo Swinson while she was on maternity leave, in 
order to participate in a key Brexit vote.  Lewis’ decision to break the pairing agreement did not 54
 In the US House of Representatives, pairing is an official practice where one member of a pair must be present in the 52
House during voting to announce how each would have voted if both had been present. Pairing is also used in the US 
Senate but there are no rules governing the practice. In cases requiring a two-thirds vote, representatives must form 
groups of three to ensure that the outcome of the vote remains as it would have been if all three were present. See 
Christopher M. Davis, Pairing in Congressional Voting: The House (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 
2015); Floyd M. Riddick, “Riddick’s Senate Procedure: Precedents and Practices” in Riddick’s Senate Procedure, ed. A. 
S. Frumin (Washington: United States Senate Publication, 1992), 1-1608. 
 E.g., William N. Eskridge, “Interpreting Legislative Inaction.” Michigan Law Review 87 (1988): 67-137, at 102.53
 Dan Sabbah and Jessica Elgot, “Jo Swinson pairing row: Conservatives admit chief whip asked MPs to break 54
arrangements” The Guardian, July 19, 2019.
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change the result of the vote, but the vote would have been different if other pairing agreements had 
been broken, as the Conservative Party whip had wanted.  
The example of pairing – understood as a form of democratic non-participation – also helps 
make the point that we should not, normally, treat people as either fully active or completely 
passive citizens. By all accounts, elected representatives are politically active, but even those who 
are members of a legislature might sometimes choose non-participation to advance democratic 
norms, such as ensuring the effective inclusion of others or maintaining legislative majorities.   
 Another form of democratic non-participation involves reflectively deferring to those who 
are more (or most) affected by particular issues.  For example, older individuals might reflectively 55
defer to younger ones when collective decisions are likely to affect the future more than the present. 
Elderly voters, for example, might refrain from voting in referendums having to do with the long-
term consequences of political independence or integration (e.g., Quebec 1995, Scotland 2014, or 
“Brexit” 2016) — just as retiring professors might refrain from making departmental decisions in 
the last years of their tenure. This is not to be confused with proposals to formally disenfranchise 
citizens on such grounds.  Reflectively deferring to the more affected is a voluntary, temporary, 56
and limited form of self-exclusion that may be informed by a principled commitment to achieving a 
better balance between affectedness and influence. In other words, this form of non-participation 
helps support a democratic principle (namely, political influence in proportion to affectedness), and 
it does so in a democratically legitimate way. It also helps ensure that, although we may be 
differently affected by political decisions, and thus justified in having more influence than others 
 Another (perhaps related) possibility is that people could choose to defer to others they believe to be more informed 55
or knowledgeable on a particular issue. Reflective deference to the more informed could help ensure – in a voluntary, 
limited, and trust-based way – that those who know more have appropriately more influence than those who know 
less, and it could, in principle, make it possible for individuals or groups to spend their limited resources on other 
democratic activities. One example is the way that minipublics such as Citizens' Assemblies or Citizens' Initiative 
Reviews can serve as trusted information proxies on issues that voters know little about (see Mackenzie and Warren, 
Two Trust-Based Uses of Minipublics, note 26 above). However, we do not have the space here to more fully develop 
this argument.
 E.g., Philippe Van Parijs, “The Disfranchisement of the Elderly, and Other Attempts to Secure Intergenerational 56
Justice” Philosophy & Public Affairs 27 (Autumn 1998): 292-333.
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over certain decisions, we can, nevertheless, remain committed to our status as political equals — 
this is because voluntary non-participation, unlike legal disenfranchisement, does not involve a 
tradeoff between (formal) equality and influence. 
 This form of democratic non-participation is also relevant to discussions about the affected 
interests principle. As Goodin has argued, although it would be desirable, on normative grounds, to 
adopt a principle of “proportionally” affected interests, it is not possible to identify a general rule 
for determining whose interests are (or will be) most affected by any particular public decision.  In 57
our account of deference to the more affected, individuals (or groups) would make decisions about 
whether they are sufficiently affected to justify their own participation, while giving due 
consideration to the ways in which others are, or may be, affected. It is unlikely that any vote, or 
democratic process, would produce a perfect balance between influence and affectedness. 
Nevertheless, reflective non-participation in the form of deference to the more affected would, if 
widespread, help produce a better balance between influence and affectedness each time a collective 
decision is made. 
 The idea that non-participation might take the form of deference to the more affected also 
emphasizes the centrality of democratic non-participation to democratic theory and practice. In this 
case, the legitimacy of democratic decisions hangs on whether or not would-be participants have 
made thoughtful decisions about whether their participation is warranted, given their own 
judgments about how collective decisions will affect themselves and others. On this account, 
deference to the more affected should, on normative grounds, be a component of every decision to 
participate, or not, in collective decision-making processes.  
   There are other reasons why those who are formally included in a political entity might 
refrain from exercising their influence. One has to do with whether they feel themselves to be 
 Robert E. Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 35 57
(January 2007): 40-68. See also Harry Brighouse and Marc Fleurbaey, “Democracy and Proportionality,” Journal of 
Political Philosophy. 18 (April 2010): 137-155. 
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legitimate members of that entity. For example, students or others who temporarily reside in a city 
or region and have the right to vote might nevertheless decide not to vote in municipal or regional 
elections if they do not see themselves as committed members of those communities. This may be 
thought of as a form of deference to the more affected (i.e., temporary residents may decide that 
longer-term residents have a greater stake than they do in municipal affairs); but this form of 
reflective non-participation might also be justified with reference to a principle of non-interference, 
according to which those who are formally included but do not see themselves as members of a 
political community should not interfere in the affairs of those who are members; they should not 
pose as members, and they should not participate as equals if they do not believe that is what they 
are. This form of non-participation overlaps to some extent with the concept of exit because it 
involves people refusing membership in a political community, but it is not a straightforward 
example of political exit. Temporary residents of a municipality or region may refrain from 
participating in that area but they are entitled to participate precisely because they are members of 
some larger political community of which the municipality or region is a part. As such, their non-
participation may be motivated by a principled concern for the democratic integrity of the parts of 
that larger system and not, therefore, understood as a form of exit or protest against the illegitimacy 
of the system. 
4.1.2. Non-Participation as Influence 
In addition to supporting the voices and influence of others, reflective non-participation may be 
used to influence the dynamics of collective decision-making processes. Consider, for example, 
reflective forms of non-opposition. Political actors (or those who would be actors) may let things 
happen without actively opposing or supporting the actions of others. This form of reflective non-
participation is well documented in small group consensus processes, such as political party 
meetings or expert committees, where group decisions are understood to have been made when 
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there are (finally) no objections expressed to specific proposals. When collective decisions are made 
in this way they do not rest on the active agreement (or consent) of all participants; instead, they 
rest, in part, on the willing suspension of disagreement and thus on the reflective silence (or non-
opposition) of those who might otherwise still disagree.  58
 Inaction as non-opposition might, of course, be underpinned by considerations that are 
undesirable from a democratic perspective. Individuals (or groups) may be silent for self-serving 
reasons, or they may be cowed into silence by external or internal group pressures.  But the 59
willingness to suspend disagreement might just as well be underpinned by principled considerations 
about, for example, the quality of the decision-making process itself. If those who disagree with an 
“apparent consensus” agree that their views were given a fair hearing, they might reflectively 
suspend their disagreement out of consideration for the integrity of the deliberative process.  Or 60
they might suspend disagreement because they believe that collective action is more desirable than 
inaction, even if they do not agree with the specific form of action that a collective process has 
sanctioned. 
 Although it has been well documented in small group decision-making contexts, non-
participation as non-opposition is also relevant in other political contexts. Consider, for example, 
the use of “no confidence” motions in parliamentary systems. In these systems, a government must 
have the support of a majority of members of parliament to retain its legitimacy to govern. If a 
parliament votes against a government on a motion of “no confidence” the government is 
dismissed, and either a new government must be formed or elections must be held. In some 
 On “political party meetings,” see Jürg Steiner and Robert H. Dorff, A Theory of Political Decision Modes: 58
Intraparty Decision Making in Switzerland (Chapel Hill: Chapel Hill University Press, 1980). Steiner and Dorff call this 
sort of decision-making “decision by interpretation.” On “expert committees” see Phillipe Urfalino, “Reasons and 
Preferences in Medicine Evaluation Committees” in Collective Wisdom: Principles and Mechanisms, ed. H. Landemore 
and J. Elster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 173-202. 
 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, (see note 15 above). 59
 On “apparent consensus,” see Urfalino, “Reasons and Preferences in Medicine Evaluation Committees” (see note 58 60
above); also John Beatty and Alfred Moore, “Should We Aim for Consensus?” Episteme 7 (October 2010): 198–214.
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situations, opposition parties may try to avoid motions of “no confidence” if they wish to neither 
actively support nor actively oppose the government. One way to do this is to ensure that the right 
number of representatives from one's party are absent from parliament when votes of “no 
confidence” are taken. If this strategy is adopted for purely self-interested reasons, such as not 
wishing to oppose bills that will please donors but harm constituents, it cannot be considered a 
democratically desirable form of non-participation. But this strategy may be justifiable on 
democratic grounds if it is, for example, adopted to prevent an unnecessary or destabilizing 
election, or because an opposition party believes that progress on other issues may be made by 
working with instead of against the government. 
4.2. Legitimation 
Political participation also has a legitimation function. In contract theories of political legitimacy, 
for example, the consent of individuals serves as the primary source or justification for political 
authority. Likewise, in modern electoral politics, voting is the foundational source of political 
consent, legitimacy, and authority.  If democratic participation has a legitimation function, it is also 61
worth considering whether non-participation might serve similar functions. One complication is that 
non-participation is typically information poor: without additional information (explanation or 
contextual interpretation) it may be difficult to determine whether non-participation represents 
passive apathy or disinterest, reflective protest against existing decision-making processes, or 
general consent (or contentedness) with the political system as a whole. In the first case, where non-
participation is the result of disinterest, a lack of awareness, or general apathy, it is does not clearly 
serve any legitimation function. In the other two cases, non-participation might challenge the 
legitimacy of a system or support it — both of which are forms of non-participation that may be 
justified on democratic grounds. 
 Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 61
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4.2.1. Non-Participation as Protest 
Non-participation may be a way for individuals or groups to protest against democratic processes 
that they do not consider legitimate. Take, for example, the reflective non-participation of some 
indigenous people in countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia. When indigenous 
people participate in the politics of a colonizing country, their participation may be viewed as a 
signal that they have come to accept political arrangements that many do not, in fact, view as 
legitimate. In these circumstances, non-voting or other forms of non-participation, might be justified 
by those who do not wish to confer legitimacy on the political system they find themselves within.  62
Consider, for example, the case of Callum Clayton-Dixon. He refused to vote in an election in 
Queensland, Australia, even though non-voting is subject to a fine. When appealing the fine, 
Clayton-Dixon argued that his participation would be illegitimate because as a member of a 
sovereign indigenous nation he does not consider himself to be a member of the Australian state. To 
participate in Australian elections would, in his view, involve speaking on behalf of others in an 
unauthorized and unwarranted representative role. On this account, his influence (however small) 
would, in principle, distort the decision-making processes of another group and thereby constitute 
an illegitimate intervention.  63
Or consider the example of Sinn Féin, the Irish republican political party. They run 
candidates in Northern Ireland for election to the United Kingdom Parliament even though they do 
not regard Northern Ireland as a legitimate part of the UK – and although they consistently win 
 E.g., Pamela Palmater, “The Power of Indigenous Peoples has Never Come from Voting in Federal Elections” 62
Rabble.ca, August 9, 2015.
 Birdie Jabour, “Aboriginal Activist who Refused to Vote for Cultural Reasons has Fine Quashed” The Guardian, 63
November 10, 2015.
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elections they do not take their seats in the UK parliament. In this way, by winning elections and 
then refusing to joint Parliament, they use non-participation as protest.  64
 In circumstances where non-participation is used as a form of protest against inappropriate 
or undesirable forms of inclusion — and the expectations of participation that go along with them 
— it is, in fact, a form of exit. In these cases, those who refrain from participating do so because 
they do not see themselves as members of the political communities in which they are included, and 
they use non-participation to call attention to this fact. In contrast, all the other examples we discuss 
involve using non-participation as a means of supporting or improving democratic processes or 
systems from within.  
 At the same time, non-participation might be used as a form of protest against a system 
without being a form of exit. In these cases, those who feel that they are, or should be, members of 
a political community might protest against the system in the hope of improving it or enhancing 
their influence within the system.  An example of this comes from Saudi Arabia where in 2015 
women were granted rights to vote and run as candidates, but only in municipal elections. Some 
women have embraced these opportunities to participate, but others have refused to vote in protest 
against the fact that women have not been granted equal political (or social) rights in Saudi 
society.  Given these circumstances, many Saudi women (and men) decided that it was better to 65
refrain from voting than to legitimize a system that is not sufficiently democratic. 
 Similarly, individuals might reflectively refrain from voting in uncontested elections — 
which are relatively common in the United States.  This decision may be underpinned by 66
disinterest or general apathy, but it might instead reflect a belief that democratic elections should, 
 This example, like that of pairing, challenges the common assumption that political elites are by definition active 64
participants. Just because a political elite is, by definition, active in some way (such as running for election) does not 
mean that she will always choose action over passivity.  
 Simon, Scott, “Women In Saudi Arabia Can Finally Vote, So Why Is Turnout So Low?” National Public Radio, 65
December 12, 2015. 
 Peverill Squire, “Uncontested Seats in State Legislative Elections” Legislative Studies Quarterly 25 (February 2000): 66
131-46.
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on principle, provide voters with choices between meaningful alternatives. Choice, itself, is a 
democratic good, but it is also a prerequisite for the realization of other goods such as electoral 
accountability.  In uncontested elections, voters can accept a candidate but they cannot actively 67
choose an alternative or replace an incumbent. In these situations, individuals might choose to 
refrain from voting in protest against this lack of choice and accountability, even if they would 
otherwise support the candidate on the ballot. This form of reflective non-participation can 
therefore be distinguished on democratic grounds from those forms of passivity that are 
underpinned by disinterest or unawareness. 
 It is, in our view, confusing to call non-participation “political action” when it is conceived 
of as protest and motivated by concerns about democratic legitimacy, while at the same time calling 
non-participation passivity when it is grounded in apathy or disinterest. Both are forms of non-
participation: the difference is that the former involves reflective decisions to refrain from 
participating in democratic processes for (in these cases) democratic reasons; while the latter is — 
by definition — largely unconcerned with those processes. This is an important distinction, and it is 
one we wish to highlight in this paper, but it is a distinction that turns on the difference between 
reflective, democratically motivated non-participation and (largely) unmotivated non-participation, 
and not on the difference between political action and inaction. 
4.2.2. Non-Participation as Legitimation 
Interestingly, although non-participation can be used to protest the legitimation functions of 
participation, it might also be used to do the opposite. In certain contexts, non-participation might 
be intended (or interpreted) as a signal that the political system is functioning well, or that decision 
makers can (or should) be trusted and invested with legitimate authority. 
 Mark E. Warren, “A Second Transformation of Democracy?” in Democracy Transformed? Expanding Political 67
Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies, ed. B. Cain, R. Dalton, and S. Scarrow (Oxford:Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 223-249. 
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 Mindful monitoring is one form of non-participation that can help support the legitimation 
functions that are normally associated with political participation. Mindful monitoring involves 
observing political issues without taking action on them. Such monitoring might be thought of as 
peripheral political vision: our focus may be elsewhere but we are aware of what is happening on 
the sidelines of our main concerns. When we judge that things are going reasonably well, and that 
certain issues are being adequately addressed by others, we may decide to forego opportunities to 
participate, but we may be spurred into action when things go badly or if we think that important 
issues are being left unaddressed or inadequately resolved. 
 But there is a difference between forms of non-participation that support the possibility of 
action (such as mindful monitoring) and those that undermine or challenge the possibility of 
effective political action (such as unreflective apathy). We cannot, of course, effectively challenge 
decisions that we disagree with if we are unaware of those decisions or our opportunities to act. 
Thus mindful monitoring is normatively better than unreflective apathy because one cannot be both 
(completely) unreflective and politically vigilant at the same time. If we are unreflectively passive 
we will be ill-equipped for action when the need to act arises. It follows from this that mindful 
monitoring can be viewed as a signal of political legitimacy if, and only if, we have reflectively 
decided to forgo real opportunities to influence public decisions because we believe that those who 
are actively involved in making those decisions are doing a reasonably good job. 
 It is also useful to clarify the difference between mindful monitoring, as a form of 
democratic non-participation, and decisions to remain silent in order to ensure that others have 
opportunities to speak. Mindful monitoring includes attentive listening, which is necessary if 
participants in deliberations are to make good judgments about when to speak and when to make 
room for others to speak, but any decision to remain silent is not itself a form of mindful 
monitoring; it is, rather, a form of democratic non-participation that is predicated on a commitment 
to the idea that everyone in a deliberation should have adequate – if not equal – opportunities to 
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contribute. While mindful monitoring is not itself a form of participation, it nevertheless supports 
both the possibility of effective participation (as we have explained) and other forms of democratic 
non-participation, such as remaining silent to let others speak.  
 Although mindful monitoring is reflective, individuals do not have to be extensively (or 
even adequately) informed on each public issue in order to engage in effective monitoring. At 
minimum, we must be peripherally aware of what is going on around us, and we must know where 
to start looking for information or opportunities for action when issues or political situations 
become problematic. In Amnå and Eckman’s theory, “standby citizens” are those who are relatively 
knowledgeable and interested in politics but nevertheless decide to refrain from actively 
participating in the democratic system.  Our account of mindful monitoring is closer to Schudson’s 68
model of the “monitorial citizen.” On his account, there is a difference between “environmental 
surveillance” and “information gathering”: becoming well-informed is costly in terms of both time 
and effort but “keeping an eye on the scene” does not require so much investment.  Mindful 69
monitoring is an important condition for choosing how and where to act, but it does not require 
extensive information gathering, and it does not in itself amount to a form of participation. 
 Mindful monitoring can also be viewed as a non-participatory way of exerting political 
influence — and this, in turn, emphasizes the extent to which different democratic functions of non-
participation are not always mutually exclusive of one another. Consider, for example, Jeffrey 
Green's theory of “ocular power.” In this theory, the public, and their assumed opinions, exercise 
influence over the actions of elected representatives and other public officials even when the public 
itself does not act.  If decision makers who know they are being watched are likely to act 70
differently than those who believe or know that they are not being watched, then mindful 
 Amnå and Eckman, “Standby Citizens,” (see note 28 above). 68
 Schudson, The Good Citizen, (see note 28 above), 310.69
 Jeffrey E. Green, The Eyes of the People: Democracy in an Age of Spectatorship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 70
2010).
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monitoring can exert influence on the political world even when individuals decide not to act. But 
like other forms of reflective non-participation, mindful monitoring is normatively desirable from a 
democratic perspective only if it is supported by real opportunities for action. This point does not, 
in our view, receive enough attention from Green. If the principal avenues for action in a 
democratic system are occasional elections or plebiscites, as Green suggests, then the power of the 
public’s gaze will be correspondingly intermittent. A popular gaze without sufficient opportunities 
for (continual) action cannot plausibly deliver the (continual) influence that is required to shape the 
actions of empowered decision makers — a point that is more clearly articulated by Urbinati in her 
account of “watching power” and by Keane in his account of monitory democracy.  In our view, 71
mindful monitoring will be most effective as a disciplinary force in democratic systems that provide 
many avenues for continual political action, even if each is only ever used by a relatively small 
number of people. 
4.3. Non-Participation as Self-Development 
We have argued that reflective non-participation can, somewhat counterintuitively, help support 
democratic goods, such as inclusion and legitimation, that we normally associate with democratic 
participation. Can non-participation also help support the self-development functions of 
participation? Perhaps. Participatory democrats have argued that the best school of democracy is 
democracy itself.  The argument is that people learn to be better democrats by acting with others in 72
democratic situations. Where there are differences of opinion and divergent interests, democratic 
actors must learn to negotiate those differences if they are to get some of what they want from 
collective decisions: they must articulate their own claims or concerns, concede and compromise 
 Nadia Urbinati, Nadia, Mill on Democracy: From the Athenian Polis to Representative Government (Chicago: 71
University of Chicago Press, 2002); Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy (see note 28 above). 
 E.g., Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government” (see note 24 above); Pateman, Participation and 72
Democratic Theory (see note 2 above).
!33
where necessary, and frame their arguments in ways that are (or may be) acceptable to others. On 
this account, non-participation is the opposite of what is needed for democratic self-development. 
 But our account of democratic non-participation gives us another way of thinking about the 
relationship between participation and the development of democratic capacities. We have argued 
that learning how and when to not participate is an important part of learning how to be a good 
democratic actor. Indeed, making judgments about when not to participate may be as important as 
learning how to act well in democratic contexts — because, as we have argued, reflective non-
participation is itself a component of acting well. (Here, again, is the oxymoronic dimension of the 
concept of democratic non-participation). 
 As with any skill, one needs experience and opportunities to practice in order to learn how 
to participate effectively in democratic contexts. If this is true for democratic participation it is also 
likely to be the case for democratic non-participation. Learning when to leave space for others to 
speak in a deliberation, for example, is a skill that has to be developed through practice, just as 
learning to articulate or defend arguments is a skill that must be learned through participation. 
Likewise, learning when, and why, to defer to the more affected is the sort of democratic skill — a 
skill of reflective non-participation — that is only likely to be learned through participation, and is 
only possible where participatory opportunities exist. 
 In our view, democratic participation and non-participation are two distinct but equally 
important components of democracy. Even though democratic non-participation is not itself action, 
it is may be necessary for political actors to learn the art of good non-participation through 
experiences of participation. 
5. Conclusion 
The idea that democratic participation and non-participation are two sides of the same coin is not 
only consistent with the arguments that Mill and Pateman, and other participatory democrats, such 
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as Barber, have made — it is, we think, implied by them.  The problem is that most participatory 73
democrats have not articulated a theory of democratic non-participation to help distinguish forms of 
non-participation that help support or enhance democratic processes from those that threaten to 
undermine them. In this paper we have suggested that there are forms of non-participation that help 
support or produce democratic goods — such as inclusion, influence, and legitimacy — that are 
normally associated with participation. Reflective non-participation — far from undermining our 
capacities for action in the future — might help support the effective participation of others, as well 
as our own efforts to participate in other ways. Furthermore, we have argued that democratic non-
participation is not a marginal option that we only occasionally confront when very specific 
circumstances arise. It is, instead, a common, familiar, and necessary (if nevertheless neglected) 
component of democratic life.  
 We have developed a theory of democratic non-participation but we hope that others will 
explore this concept in systematic, large-N studies. Survey researchers might, for example, ask 
respondents to explain the reasons they have for being active or inactive in response to specific (real 
or hypothetical) opportunities for action.  Another approach might use experimental treatments to 74
prime participants to consider forms of democratic non-participation in order to determine when 
people are willing to choose inaction over action for democratic reasons. It will be especially 
interesting to explore when, or whether, people are willing to tradeoff democratic goods associated 
with non-participation, such as allowing others to speak, with democratic goods associated with 
participation, such as voicing one's own concerns. Non-participation has often appeared as a sort of 
shadow behind the ideal of democratic participation. In this paper we have tried to give greater 
 Ibid. See, also, Barber, Strong Democracy (see note 2 above). 73
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non-participation see Bannon, “Voting, Non-Voting and Consumer Buying Behavior; and Zukin et al., A New 
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and Ellen Shearer, Nonvoters: America's No-Shows (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1999). 
!35
visibility and structure to the concept of non-participation in order to develop the theoretical 
resources need for articulating, and empirically exploring, its democratic potential.  
 
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